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Abstract 
 
 
Between 1810 and 1940, a large GDP per capita gap appeared between the industrial core 
and the poor periphery, the latter producing, increasingly, primary products. Over the 
same period, the terms of trade facing the periphery underwent a secular boom then bust, 
peaking in the 1870s or 1890s. These terms of trade trends appear to have been 
exogenous to the periphery. Additionally, the terms of trade facing the periphery 
exhibited relatively high volatility. Are these correlations spurious, or are they causal? 
This Figuerola Lecture, to be given at Carlos III University (Madrid) , argues that they are 
causal, that secular growth and volatility in the terms of trade had asymmetric effects on 
core and periphery. On the upswing, the secular rise in its terms of trade had powerful de -
industrialization effects in the periphery. Over the full cycle 1810-1940, terms of trade 
volatility suppressed accumulation and growth in the periphery as well. 
 
Jeffrey G. Williamson 
Department of Economics 
Harvard University 
Cambridge, MA 02138 
and NBER 
jwilliam@fas.harvard.edu 
 
JEL No. F10, N10, O10 
 
 1 
Laws of Motion 
Secular Terms of Trade Boom and Bust in the Periphery 1810-1940 
 
This Lecture defines the core as northwest Europe and their overseas settlements, 
regions where the industrial revolution spread as the 19th century unfolded. The periphery 
includes the rest – industrially-lagging Europe to the east and south of the core, the 
Middle East, Africa, Asia and Latin America. The pre-modern era is defined as the first 
global century, about 1810 or 1820 to 1913, plus the anti-global, autarkic interwar, from 
1913 to 1940.  
The economic impact of the core on the periphery had its source in two forces 
which arose during the first global century. The first was a world-wide transport 
revolution that served to integrate world commodity markets (O’Rourke and Williamson 
1999: Ch. 3; Mohammed and Williamson 2004; Williamson 2005a: Chs. 2 and 3) . It 
caused a boom in trade between core and periphery, created commodity pr ice 
convergence for tradable goods between all world markets, and contributed to a rise in 
every country’s external terms of trade, including the periphery, indeed, especially in the 
periphery. The second force came from the derived demand for industrial intermediates, 
like cotton, rubber and metals, which soared as manufacturing production led the way in 
the core. Thus, as core economies raised their industrial output shares, manufacturing 
output growth raced ahead of GDP growth. Rapid productivity growth lowered the cost 
and price of manufactures, and by so doing generated a soaring derived demand for raw 
materials in the core. This event was reinforced by accelerating income per capita growth 
and a high income elasticity of demand for luxury consumption goods, like meat, tea, and 
coffee. Since industrialization was driven by unbalanced productivity advance favoring 
manufacturing relative to agriculture and other natural-resource based activities, the 
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relative price of manufactures fell everywhere, especially in the periphery where they 
were imported. The world transport revolution made it possible for the distant periphery 
to supply this booming demand for primary products in the core. Both forces produced 
positive, powerful and sustained terms of trade shocks in the periphery, raising the 
relative price of primary products, and through an epoch which stretched over as much as 
seventy or eighty years. Factor supply responses in the periphery facilitated these external 
demand shocks, carried by migrations from labor abundant to labor scarce regions within 
the periphery and by financial capital flows from the core to those same regions.  
Eventually these two forces abated. The rate of decline in real transport costs 
along sea lanes slowed down, approaching a late 20th century steady state (Mohammed 
and Williamson 2004). The rate of growth of manufacturing slowed down in the core as 
the transition to industrial maturity was completed. As these two forces abated, the 
resulting slow down in primary product demand growth was reinforced by resource-
saving innovations in the industrial core, induced, in large part, by those high and rising 
primary product prices during the 19th century terms of trade upswing. Thus, the secular 
boom faded, eventually turning into a secular bust. Exactly when and where the boom 
turned to bust depended on export commodity specialization, but the periphery peak 
ranged between the 1870s and the 1890s. 
This 130-year cycle in the periphery terms of trade is illustrated in Figure 1 by 
Latin American experience. The region’s terms of trade 1 underwent a steady increase 
from the 1810s to the early 1890s, and the improvement was especially dramatic during 
the first four decades: the annual rate of increase was 1.3 percent per annum between the 
                                                               
1 There are eight countries underlying the regional series, all of which achieved political independence 
early in the 130-year terms of trade cycle: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Mexico, Peru and 
Uruguay. 
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starting the half-decade 1815-19 and concluding the half-decade 1890-94, equivalent to 
almost a tripling over the 75 years; and the rate between 1815-19 and 1855-59 was even 
larger, 2.05 percent per annum. Furthermore, that increase is probably understated since it 
fails to take account of the likely increase in the quality of traded manufactures relative to 
primary products, estimated in Figure 1 by the dashed line. Based on the estimates 
underlying Figure 1 reported in Appendix 1, the quality-adjusted terms of trade may have 
grown at a little more than 2.2 percent per annum between 1815-19 and 1855-59, and at a 
little more than 1.4 percent per annum between 1815-19 and 1890-94.  
Nor was Latin American experience with that secular upswing unusual. Figure 2 
documents that the increase was even bigger in Egypt, the Ottoman Empire (Turkey) and 
Indonesia.2 What went up then came down with a crash, as the periphery terms of trade 
fell from the 1870s or 1890s to World War II. As it turns out, the size of that crash has 
been overstated to the extent that manufactured commodities underwent much faster 
quality improvement than primary products. Once again, the dashed line in Figure 1 
illustrates the point by use of Latin America: since relative quality gains are typically 
ignored in estimates of trade trends, and since they favor manufacturing, the quality-
adjusted price of manufactures must have fallen by more than the unadjusted series 
documents (see Appendix 1), enough to have removed some of the terms of trade crash. 
Exactly how much of the crash would be removed with better quality adjustments is 
unclear, but this new adjusted series still documents a secular cycle over the 130 years. 
Whether during boom or bust, technological advance and human capital 
accumulation were so modest in the periphery that the living standard gap between it and 
                                                               
2 The boom was more modest in India (Clingingsmith and Williamson 2004), but it was about the same in 
the Mideast after 1839, and even more dramatic in Japan after 1858 and the gunboat-forced opening up. 
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the core surged to levels that were vastly wider at the end of the cycle than when it started 
almost a century and a half before. Whether the modest rates of technological advance 
and human capital accumulation in the periphery were caused at least partly by 
globalization-induced de-industrialization forces has, of course, been a central issue in 
growth and development debate since it all started. 
Between 1810 and 1940, the periphery obeyed laws of motion that economists 
delight in exploring. The long run secular boom and bust was generated in response to 
two of the most profound technological shocks the world had yet seen – in industry and 
transportation, shocks exogenous to the periphery if not the core. Elsewhere, I have 
assessed the implications of this secular cycle in terms of trade on income distribution 
(Williamson 2002, 2005a), and then asked how trade policy responded to it in periphery 
regions with and without autonomy (Coatsworth and Williamson 2004a, b; Williamson 
2005a, b). This Lecture documents these laws of motion in the periphery and assesses 
their growth consequences. 
Finally, consider price volatility around those secular trends. Both Figures 1 and 2 
illustrate that the terms of trade facing the poor periphery underwent tremendous 
instability over the 130 years between 1810 and 1940, and it was primary product price 
instability doing almost all of the work. What impact did that market volatility have on 
growth performance in the periphery? 
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Prebisch, Singer and the Terms of Trade Debate 
 
Debate over trends in the terms of trade between primary products and 
manufactures, their causes and their impact has dominated the growth and development 
literature for almost two centur ies. Classical economists claimed that the relative price of 
primary commodities should improve over time, since land and other natural resources 
were in inelastic supply while capital and labor were not. As we shall see, the experience 
over the half century or so before 1870 proved them right: the relative price of 
manufactures underwent a spectacular decline, while that of primary products soared. In 
the early 1950s, however, Hans Singer and Raúl Prebisch challenged the classical view, 
asserting that the terms of trade of the primary-product-producing Third World had 
deteriorated since the late 19th century. Indeed, Prebisch calculated that only 63 percent 
of the finished manufactures which could be bought with a given quantity of primary 
products in the 1860s could be purchased in the 1930s. Prebisch and Singer also 
projected that it would continue to deteriorate across the late 20th century as long as the 
Third World specialized in primary products. It turned out that their projection was not 
confirmed by late 20th century experience, but my interest lies instead with the 130 years 
between 1810 and 1940, when the new economic order came to be firmly established. 
This important part of the development literature has its shortcomings. While 
faster technological progress in manufacturing may have caused the price of 
manufactures to fall relative to primary products over most of the 19th century, and while 
the 19th century world transport revolution reinforced those forces by lowering import 
prices and raising export prices in periphery markets, Prebisch and Singer elected to 
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stress the 20th century downside of this secular cycle. Furthermore, while the secular 
upswing of the terms of trade should have caused de-industrialization -- something of 
which another part of the literature has made much -- Prebisch, Singer and their followers 
ignored this de-industrialization inference. By so doing, they also ignored a symmetric 
corollary: on the downside, the secular terms of trade deterioration also implied a long 
run stimulus to import-competing industry in the periphery, what might be called re-
industrialization. Prebisch ignored this possibility, and stressed instead the short run 
economic damage to a periphery so committed to primary product exports.  
The main weakness of this literature, however, is that Prebisch, Singer, and much 
of the contributors to the subsequent literature dealt with the relative price of primary 
products in world markets, not with the terms of trade facing any given country in the 
poor periphery. Nor did they assess the economic impact on the poor periphery. Rather, 
they assumed it. 
 
Agenda: Assessing the Impact of Secular Terms of Trade  Trends   
on the Pre-Modern Periphery 
  
 New data confirm that the terms of trade (unadjusted for quality change) fell 
everywhere in the periphery between the 1870s or 1890s and the 1930s, consistent with 
the Prebisch-Singer calculation based on commodity prices in core markets rather than 
(as in this Lecture) on prices in periphery locations. This secular decline in the terms of 
trade in what we now call the Third World is confirmed by the large 21-country 
periphery sample underlying Figures 3 and 4: for Asia,3 the fall from its 1870s peak to its 
                                                               
3 There are ten countries in our Asia sample: Burma, Ceylon, China, Egypt, Indonesia, Japan, the 
Philippines, Siam and Turkey (the Ottoman Empire). 
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1930s trough was 29 percent; for Latin America, the fall from its 1885-1895 peak to its 
1930s trough was 40 percent. As we have seen, this secular decline was used to support 
the move towards Third World autarky in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, a highly 
interventionist industrialization strategy which eventually came to be called import 
substitution industrialization (ISI). While Singer also advocated this anti-global ISI 
strategy, he noted that if the post-1950 relative price of primary products ever did 
improve, it would reduce industrialization incentives in the periphery (Singer 1950: 482). 
Thus, while a post-1950 improvement in the primary product exporter’s terms of trade 
might augment incomes in the short run, a good thing, Singer thought it was also likely to 
suppress industrialization in the long run, a bad thing.  No one seemed to pay much 
attention to Singer’s aside at that time, including Singer himself.  
Many modern economists have reached Singer’s conclusion, but for different 
reasons. Some have argued that resources are a “curse” to development, such that while 
an improvement in the terms of trade facing primary product exporters would increase 
the value of the resource base being exploited, poor growth would result. Jeffrey Sachs 
and Andrew Warner (2001) have confirmed the correlation, but economists have not yet 
agreed on how the “resource curse” works. Some argue that resource abundant poor 
countries have undeveloped property rights such that terms of trade booms get translated 
into capital flight (a transfer of rents for safe keeping in rich countries: Torne ll and 
Velasco 1992). Others make the case for growth-suppressing rent-seeking (Krueger 1974; 
Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Baland and Francois 2000) and to growth-distorting 
government policy (Tornell and Lane 1999) . Still others favor crowding-out and Dutch 
disease, a position this Lecture also favor s. Initiated first by Bob Gregory (1976), Max 
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Corden (1981, 1984) and Corden and Peter Neary (1982), a huge literature has developed 
over the past twenty-five years which has examined how manufacturing in modern 
economies has been affected by the discovery of tradable natural resources or by an 
increase in their price. The name “Dutch disease” is taken from the impact of natural gas 
price increases on the Dutch economy in the 1970s. The most extensive applications, 
however, have been to Third World economies which specialize in primary products. 
There have been far fewer applications of de -industrialization and Dutch disease models 
to development in the periphery over the 120 or 130 years before the modern late 20th 
century experience. Whichever view one supports, the Sachs-Warner correlation has also 
been found in the more distant past: my earlier work with Yael Hadass (Hadass and 
Williamson 2003) found that for a small sample of primary product exporters between 
1870 and World War I poor growth did ensue following the terms of trade improvement, 
lending some limited support to resource curse theories. 
 Others have argued for the more benign classical view where an increase in the 
price of the primary product export raises the expected rate of return on investment in 
that sector, thus augmenting accumulation and growth economy-wide. Using a cross-
country panel of 40 countries from 1970 to 1991, Enrique Mendoza (1997) did indeed 
find that an increase in the growth rate of the terms of trade by 1 percent raised the 
growth rate of consumption by 0.2 percent, although most of the developing countries in 
his sample were exporting labor -intensive manufactures by the end of the period, not 
primary products.4 Still, Michael Bleaney and David Greenaway (2001) used Mendoza’s 
model to analyze sub-Saharan Africa between 1980 and 1995, where primary product 
                                                               
4  Industrial manufactures have been a rapidly ris ing share of Third World output and exports, as we shall 
see below.  
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exports still dominated (at least up to the early 1990s: see below), finding that both GDP 
per capita growth and investment increased as the terms of trade improved. 
 The Prebisch-Singer primary-product-terms-of-trade-deterioration thesis has not 
survived the half century since they wrote: fifty years later, we now think that structural 
breaks, serially correlated residuals, and unit roots may explain the 20th century 
(unadjusted) terms of trade patterns we see, or that proper quality-adjustment might 
further erase any deterioration (Lipsey 1994). Thus, Enzo Grilli and Maw Cheng Yang 
(1988) analyzed 20th century commodity price data and found evidence of periodic 
structural breaks, but no trend. Bleaney and Greenaway (1993) contested this finding, but 
were able to document only a modest downward trend. Furthermore, and to repeat, most 
of the periphery was little damaged by this modest secular deterioration since by the 
1990s the majority had shifted out of primary-product exports and in to labor-intensive 
manufacture exports. Thus , from today’s vantage point, the Prebisch-Singer secular 
deterioration hypothesis, and its implied negative impact, can be rejected. It is not clear, 
however, that it should be rejected from the vantage point of 1950 when Singer and 
Prebisch were looking backward to the 1870s. Nor has the modern literature yet 
measured the impact that the terms of trade secular deterioration had on long run GDP 
per capita growth in the periphery.  And if we had the answer, we could then use it to help 
assess data-scarce terms of trade boom period before the 1870s, when the great 
divergence between center and periphery development levels appeared. 
 The jury is still out. What we need is a larger sample of periphery countries, and 
we need it for the period that motivated the Prebisch-Singer debate in the first place. It 
has prove n difficult to construct the necessary data base for the pre-1870 epoch, but we 
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have done it for the post-1870 epoch. So, when the terms of trade of primary products 
deteriorated between 1870 and 1940, what was its economic impact on the periphery? 
The answer will hinge on two additional questions: When and where in the periphery did 
the terms of trade deteriorate, and by how much? When and where it did deteriorate, and 
thus when and where the relative price of import competing manufactures rose, was the 
positive long run GDP growth stimulated by induced industrialization enough to 
overcome the negative short run effect? 
  
Agenda: Assessing the Impact of Terms of Trade Volatility on the  
Pre-Modern Periphery 
 
 Until the last three decades or so, most countries in the periphery specialized in 
the export of just a handful of commodities (Table 1, cols. 3 and 7). In the 1920s, for 
example, the top two exports were 82 percent of all exports from the average Third 
World country, while they were 12 percent in the industrial core even two decades 
earlier. Furthermore, some of these commodities had prices which were a lot more 
volatile than others, and those countries with the greater volatility grew more slowly 
relative to the industrial leaders and relative to other primary product exporters. Figure 5 
charts income per head in 1939 against terms of trade volatility for 35 countries between 
1870 and 1939. 5 Volatility is measured as the standard deviation of departures from a 
slow -moving trend. 6 The figure clearly depicts a negative correlation between terms of 
trade volatility and subsequent level of development, not just in the total sample but also 
within the subset of primary product-specialized countries in the periphery. Figure 6 
                                                               
5 The World War I years are omitted. The 35 countries in the Blattman-Hwang-Williamson sample are 
listed in Table 1. 
6 This trend was calculated using a Hodrick-Prescott filter. See the discussion in Appendix 2.  
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charts 1939 income per head against the secular trend in the terms of trade. Within both 
the periphery and the core, we see a positive correlation between growth in the terms of 
trade and subsequent level of development. As noted above, these correlations are 
reminiscent of what Carlos Diaz-Alejandro (1984) called the commodity lottery. He 
argued that each country’s exportable resources were determined in large part by 
geography (plus the previous century’s experience with global market integration), and 
that differences in subsequent economic development were a consequence of the 
economic, political and institutional attributes of each commodity.  
So far, this Lecture has focused on secular terms of trade movements and their 
implications for industrialization and de -industrialization, but could it be that exogenous 
price volatility of each primary product also mattered by generating internal instability, 
reduced investment, and diminished economic growth? Observers regularly point to 
terms of trade shocks as a key source of macroeconomic instability in commodity-
specialized countries, but they pay far less attention to the long run growth implications 
of such instability.7 Most theories stress the investment channel in looking for 
connections between terms of trade instability and growth. Indeed, the development 
literature offers an abundance of microeconomic evidence linking income volatility to 
lower investment in both physical and human capital. Households imperfectly protected 
from risk change their income-generating activities in the face of income volatility, 
diversifying towards low-risk alternatives with lower average returns (Dercon 2004; 
Fafchamps 2004), as well as to lower levels of investment (Rosenweig and Wolpin 
1993). Furthermore , severe cuts in health and education follow negative shocks to 
                                                               
7 For important exceptions, see Mendoza (1997), Deaton and Miller (1996), Kose and Reizman (2001), 
Bleaney and Greenway (2001), and Hadass and Williamson (2003). 
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household income in poor countries—cuts that disproportionately affect children and 
hence long term human capital accumulation (Jensen 2000; Jacoby and Skoufias 1997; 
Frankenburg et al. 1999; Thomas et al. 2004). 
Poor households find it difficult to smooth their expenditures in the face of shocks 
because they are rationed in credit and insurance markets, so they lower investment and 
take fewer risks with what remains. Poor firms find it difficult to smooth net returns on 
their assets, so they lower investment and take fewer risks with what remains. Perhaps 
most importantly, poor governments whose revenue sources are mainly volatile customs 
duties (Coatsworth and Williamson 2004b; Williamson 2005b) and which also find it 
difficult to borrow at cheap rates locally and internationally, cannot without serious 
difficulty smooth public investment in and expenditure on long run infrastructure and 
education in the face of terms of trade shocks.8 Lower public investment ensues, and 
growth rates fall. Garey and Valerie Ramey (1995) examined the macroeconomic 
volatility and growth correlation using data from 92 developing and developed 
economies between 1962 and 1985. They found government spending and 
macroeconomic volatility to be inversely related, and that countries with higher volatility 
had lower mean growth.  
In short, theory informs us that higher volatility in the terms of trade should 
reduce investment and growth in the presence of risk aversion. In addition, the less-risky 
investment that does take place will also be low-return. Modern evidence seems to be 
consistent with the theory. What is true of the modern era was probably even more true of 
the 1870-1940 when undeveloped financial institutions and a limited tax base made it 
                                                               
8 While greater volatility increases the need for international borrowing to help smooth domestic 
consumption, Catão and Kapur (2004) have shown recently that volatility constrained the ability to borrow 
between 1970 and 2001. It seems likely that the same was true between 1870 and 1901, a century earlier. 
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even harder for poor households, poor firms and poor governments to smooth 
expenditures. And, in turn, what was true of 1870-1940 must have been even more true of 
1810-1870, and for the same reasons. 
 
The Jury Is In: 
The Impact of Secular Trend and Volatility in Periphery Terms of Trade 1870-1939 
 
There are 35 countries in the historical sample9 that Chris Blattman, Jason Hwang 
and I (Blattman, Hwang and Williamson 2004) used recently to explore these issues: 14 
in the core and 21 in the periphery, although the results are robust to every plausible core-
periphery allocation explored. Table 1 lists the 35 by GDP per capita, the dominance of 
primary products in exports, export concentration and export shares in GDP. The impact 
of secular change and volatility in the terms of trade are presented in Table 2. Results are 
displayed for the full seven decades (1870-1939) , although it has been shown that the two 
sub-periods -- the first global century from 1870 to 1909 and the interwar autarchic 
disaster from 1920 to 1939 – exhibit the same behavior.10 The World War I decade is 
omitted throughout.  
The results are reported separately for the core and periphery, making it possible 
to test for the presence of asymmetry between them. Asymmetry is predicted by the 
following reasoning. Consider secular impact first. To the extent that the periphery 
                                                               
9 This sample covered about 90 percent of world population in 1900, and an even bigger share of world 
GDP and trade. See Table 1 for a listing for the 9 European core countries, their 3 rich overseas offshoots, 
21 poor periphery countries, and 2 on the margin. 
10 The periphery consists of 21 countries. Data exist for every country and every decade, except for one 
country-decade observation, yielding a sample of 125 (=21x6-1). There are a few more missing 
observations from the interwar core, leaving 79 observations instead of the 84 (=14x6) that would be 
available in a complete dataset. The full data base is described in Blattman, Hwang, and Williamson 
(2004). 
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specializes in primary products, and to the extent that industry is a carrier of 
development, then positive price shocks reinforce specialization in the periphery and 
cause de-industrialization there, offsetting the short run income and static specialization 
gains yielded by the terms of trade improvement. However, there is no such offset in the 
core, but rather there is a reinforcement, since specialization in industrial products is 
strengthened there by an improvement in the terms of trade. Thus, the prediction is that 
while a secular terms of trade improvement unambiguously raises growth rates in the 
industrial core, it does not do so in the periphery. I expect the same asymmetry with 
respect to terms of trade volatility to the extent that “insurance” is cheaper and more 
widely available in the core. For example, to the extent that core governments have a 
much wider range of tax sources, their tax revenues should be more stable in response to 
terms of trade shocks than should be true of periphery governments which rely instead on 
tariffs and export taxes. The induced macro-instability should have suppressed 
accumulation in risk adverse periphery countries: poor governments should have invested 
less in their infrastructure; poor parents should have invested less in the education of 
themselves and their children; and poor firms should have invested less in new products 
and new technologies. 
To see whether the terms of trade impact was contingent upon the level of export 
dependence, our previous collaborative work added a term interacting TOT Trend 
Growth with export share of GDP. The motivation, of course was that more export-
oriented countries seemed likely to respond more forcefully to external shocks. Export 
shares were taken from the first year of the decade to avoid problems of endogeneity. In 
any case, the key results were not greatly influence by this complication, so Table 2 
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ignores it in order to make things simple here. Finally, Table 2 also reports estimates with 
and without control variables representing other long run growth “fundamentals” like 
(log) initial GDP per capita, lagged population growth and the prevalence of schooling. I 
favor the results with the controls, so I will focus on cols. (2), (4), (6) and (8) in what 
follows.  
The top half of Table 2 reports the regression estimates and hypothesis testing for 
the terms of trade effects. The bottom half reports the quantitative and economic 
importance of these terms of trade effects. Thus, the bottom half shows the sample means 
and standard deviations of the independent variables. The ir marginal impact is, of course,  
measured as the predicted change in output growth from a marginal increase in the 
independent variable. That is, for both terms of trade trend growth and volatility, the 
marginal impact is just the reported coefficient estimate. However, the last rows of Table 
2 show the predicted change in output from a one-standard-deviation increase in either 
the growth or volatility of the terms of trade, thus showing how a plausible change in 
either independent variable would have influenced output. The word “plausible” applies 
to the years covered by the sample, namely 1870-1939. The change may not be quite so 
plausible when applied outside the sample, namely 1810-1870, when the terms of trade 
for primary products soared. We will return to this issue below. 
Columns (2) and (4) strongly support the asymmetry hypothesis. Greater secular 
improvements in the terms of trade were significantly and positively associated with long 
run output growth in the core, but not in the periphery.  While the core benefited greatly 
from a small but positive secular improvement in its terms of trade, positive improvement 
in the periphery—when it made a rare appearance—did not translate in to more growth, 
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but less.  Greater volatility had a significant negative influence on income growth in the 
periphery, but not in the core. 
Although not reported here, the main findings continue to receive strong support 
for the pre-World War I years. Secular improvements in the terms of trade raised long run 
output growth in the core, but not in the periphery, while greater volatility diminished 
growth in the periphery, but not in the core. The interwar years involve a much smaller 
sample and, as a result, the standard error s are large and the statistical significance is low, 
but the point estimates are generally consistent with those found for the pre-war era. It 
seems reasonable, therefore, to conclude that the same forces were at work both before 
and after the war. Still, strong support for the asymmetry hypothesis is especially 
welcome for the 1870-1910 years, since that result will reinforce the plausibility of 
exploring its implications for the immediately preceding 1810-1870 period. 
The economic effects were very big. A one-standard-deviation increase in TOT 
Trend Growth was associated with a 0.64 percentage point increase in the average annual 
growth rate of per capita GDP in the core -- a big number given that the average annual 
per capita growth rate in the core was just 1. 59 percent. The economic effect of TOT 
Volatility in the periphery was even bigger: a one -standard-deviation increase lowered 
output growth by nearly 0.39 percentage points, a big number given that the average per 
capita growth rate in the periphery was just 1.05 percent per annum. To repeat, these 
magnitudes are very similar with and without the export share interaction term.  
More generally, these magnitudes suggest that terms of trade shocks were an 
important force behind the big divergence in income levels between core and periphery, a 
core-periphery gap that started to open up so dramatically in the early 19th century 
 17 
(Pritchett 1997). The gap in per capita income per annum growth rates between core and 
periphery in our sample was 0.54 percentage points (1.59 – 1.05). If the periphery had 
experienced the same terms of trade volatility as the core, price volatility would have 
been reduced by 1.98 (d=[8.80 - 6.82]=+1.98), adding 0.16 percentage points to average 
GDP per capita growth rates there ([ß=-0.08]x[d=-1.98] = +0.16). This alone erases about 
a third of the output per capita growth gap (0.16/.54=0.3). If, in addition, the core had 
experienced the same secular deterioration in its terms of trade that the periphery did  
(-0.28) , instead of the observed positive 0.3 percent per annum growth rate (d=[ -0.28-
(+)0.30]=-0.58), this would have reduced output growth there by 0.37 percentage points 
([ß=+0.63]x[d=-0.58] = -0.37). Combined, these two counterfactuals would have 
eliminated nearly the entire gap in growth rates between core and periphery (0.16+0.37= 
0.53). These results are robust to the use of alternative periphery allocations, terms of 
trade growth and volatility measures, and time period. 11 However, they are not robust to 
assumptions about estimated quality change in traded manufactures. Recall that Lipsey 
(1964: 19) concluded that quality improvements in traded manufactured goods was too 
slow to influence short run terms of trade instability, so any estimated quality adjustment 
should not influence our volatility inferences. It did, however, influence secular change in 
the terms of trade, as we see in Figure 1: while the unadjusted terms of trade in the core 
rose by 0.30 percent per annum between 1870 and 1939, according to these estimates the 
quality-adjusted terms of trade did not rise at all (0.30-0.33=-0.03). Thus, secular 
movements in the terms of trade may have contributed nothing to the growth gap between 
core and periphery after 1870. Before 1870 is another matter, however, since the 
                                                               
11 See the appendix tables in Blattman, Hwang and Williamson (2004). 
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unadjusted terms of trade boom was much bigger and quality improvements in trade d 
manufactures were much smaller. 
What accounts for the asymmetric effects of terms of trade growth between core 
and periphery over the seven decades 1870 to 1940? The core benefited from a secular 
increase in its terms of trade since it reinforced comparative advantage there, helped 
stimulate industrialization, thus augmenting growth-induced spillovers. That is, dynamic 
effects reinforced static effects. The fact that the periphery, in contrast, did not benefit 
when the terms of trade rose over the long-term, or suffer when it fell, appears to support 
de-industrialization and resource curse effects. That is, dynamic loses offset static gains. 
For me, the place to look for the source of dynamic asymmetry between secular impact 
on core and periphery is de-industrialization.  
But what accounts for the asymmetric effects of terms of trade volatility between 
core and periphery after 1870? To illustrate the impact of terms of trade volatility in the 
periphery, consider that per capita income in Canada grew faster than in Indonesia by 
about 1 percent per annum. The difference in terms of trade volatility between the two 
countries was just under one half of one standard deviation. The estimates in Table 2 
imply that if, through better luck in the commodity lottery, Indonesia had experienced 
Canada’s smaller terms of trade volatility, it would have grown faster by about 0.3 
percentage points, reducing the growth rate gap between them by a third. So, exactly 
what kind of insurance did the industrial core take out that allowed it to escape the 
damaging consequences of terms of trade instability, insurance that was not, apparently, 
available to primary product exporters in the periphery? Did the industrial core simply 
have better-developed institutions, policies and tax mechanisms by which to insure 
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against adverse shocks? I do not offer any answers here in this Lecture, but the questions 
certainly suggest an exciting agenda for the future. 
 
Volatility, Accumulation Inferences and Backward Projections to 1815 
 
 Although the secular rise in the periphery’s terms of trade up to the 1870s or 
1890s was certainly spectacular, the empirical results for 1870-1939 suggest that they 
probably made no positive contribution to economic growth there. While much more 
needs to be done to identify the channels of this impact, the most promising hypothesis is 
that de-industrialization was the long run offset to short run income or medium term 
specialization gains. Furthermore, to the extent that industrialization had a positive 
impact on human and physical capital accumulation, this is one plausible channel through 
which de -industrialization contributed to diminished growth. We will pursue the 
connection below. 
But assuming for the moment that the secular boom in the terms of trade had no 
net long term positive impact in the poor periphery, what about the negative impact of 
export price and terms of trade volatility? Once again, while the data are not adequate to 
estimate the impact of pre-1870 volatility, we can use the 1870-1939 parameter estimates 
to project that impact backwards given the pre-1870 terms of trade experience. One only 
has to assume that the pre-1870 forces at work were equal to or greater than those 
estimated for post-1870, an assumption which seems plausible to me. Thus, I use the 
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same Hodrick-Prescott filter to remove the trend from the pre-1870 terms of trade 
reported for various periphery regions, leaving the volatility portion for analysis.12  
I have collected pre-1870 terms of trade time series for the following seven 
regions in the poor periphery: Egypt, India, Indonesia, Latin America, the Mideast, Spain 
and the Ottoman Empire (Turkey).13 What follows immediately below are volatility 
statistics measured by the standard deviation from trend (Appendix 2), where, of course, 
bigger standard deviations imply greater terms of trade volatility: 
Indonesia 1820-1870  3.81 
Latin America 1820-1870 5.18 
 Spain 1815-1870  7.95 
 Turkey 1815-1870  9.24 
 Mideast 1839-1870           19.82 
India 1815-1870           23.09 
 Egypt 1820-1870           31.45 
 
 1815-1870 average            14.39 
 1870-1939 average   8.80 
 UK 1815-1870  6.45  
The terms of trade volatility in the poor periphery was much greater before 1870 than 
after – more than half again as large -- implying that it played an even bigger role in 
contributing to the core-periphery growth rate gap before 1870. If the GDP per capita 
growth gap between core and periphery 1815-1870 was anything like it was 1870-1939, 
terms of trade volatility must have explained two thirds of the gap. To be more confident 
about this inference, we need to compare periphery with core. Recall from Table 2 that 
the periphery-core volatility difference was +1.98 between 1870 and 1939. If we take the 
                                                               
12 I am grateful to Jason Hwang for deco mposing growth and volatility from my new 1810-1870 terms of 
trade series. We use the same procedure for the pre-1870 data as that which was applied to the post-1870 
data. 
13 The series for Japan starts too late, 1858, for the volatility analysis. There are  other time series which I 
hope to add in the near future, including Portugal 1842-1870 and Italy 1815-1870 from the south European 
periphery. New potential candidates from Asia might be China and the Philippines, as well as some from 
the east European periphery.  
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UK to represent the core before 1870, then its relative terms of trade stability (6.45 for 
the UK before 1870 versus 8.80 for the core after 1870) implies an even bigger volatility 
difference between core and periphery before 1870 than after, compared to what the raw 
volatility statistics for the periphery suggest. Thus, if the periphery had experienced the 
same terms of trade volatility as did the United Kingdom, volatility there would have 
been reduced by 7.91 (d=[14.39-6.45]=+7.94), adding a huge 0.63 percentage points to 
average GDP per capita growth rates there ([ß=-0.08]x[d=-7.94] = +0.63).  
While the volatility differences before and after 1870 are large, the differences 
between the periphery regions are even larger. Indonesia and Latin America had 
relatively stable terms of trade (compared to the periphery average and to the United 
Kingdom) , so poor growth performance cannot be laid at the feet of terms of trade 
volatility in that region. Egypt, India and the Mideast, on the other hand, had immense 
volatility, and their growth must have suffered greatly as a consequence. Spain and 
Turkey lay somewhere in between with volatility figures (7.95 and 9.24) close to the 
post-1870 periphery average (8.80), but still higher than the pre-1870 United Kingdom 
figure (6.45) and the post-1870 core average (6.82).  
Terms of trade volatility in the periphery suppressed long run growth 
considerably there, helping contribute to the rising GDP per capita gap between it and the 
core. As we suggested above, it seems likely that the key channel of impact was through 
suppressed accumulation rates. Indeed, when one channel of terms of trade impact is 
investigated—the flow of investment funds from Britain—it appears that capital inflows 
1870-1939 were negatively influenced by terms of trade volatility in the periphery, but 
not in the core (Blattman, Hwang and Williamson 2004).  
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Are the magnitudes driving the econometric result in Table 2 plausible? That is, 
how much would accumulation rates and investment rates have to have fallen in the poor 
periphery to account for the estimated impact of terms of trade volatility on growth? The 
econometric estimates in Table 2 argue that terms of trade volatility 1870-1939 lowered 
per capita GDP growth in the periphery by 0.7 percentage points (-0.7=8.8x-0.08) or by 
almost 0.2 percentage points compared with the core (-0.16=[8.80-6.82]x-0.08). 
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function, the capital-output ratio (K/Y) to be 
constant at 3, capital’s share (a) to be 0.3, and letting I = dK, the change in the rate of per 
capita GDP growth in percentage points (?y*) is 
? y* = a?(I/K) = a?([I/Y][Y/K]) = [a/(K/Y)]? [I/Y] 
       = 0.3/3?[I/Y] = 0.1 ?[I/Y] 
   or ?[I/Y] = ?y*/0.1.  
This implies that the net investment share need only have fallen by about 2 percentage 
points (-.16/0.1 = -1.6) to reproduce the econometric estimate of terms of trade volatility 
on growth, that is from 7 to 5 percent. This seems like a plausible range to me, and it is 
close to a third of W. Arthur Lewis’s famous dictum that the key to development in the 
poor periphery was to increase the net investment rate there from 5 to 12 percent (Lewis 
1954: 155).14 Two thirds for fundamentals like culture, geography and institutions, and 
one third for terms of trade volatility seems about right to me, although these figures 
probably reversed their relative magnitudes before 1870. 
 
 
                                                               
14 Recall that Sir Arthur made that statement in 1954 long before Third World investment rates two or three 
times that 12 percent became so common. His observation was based on 19th century (slow population 
growth) experience, and that’s what we are trying to explain here as well. 
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Does the Past Inform the Future? 
 
Should we expect the same volatility and secular growth effects for the post-1970 
decades? I doubt it: the effect has probably vanished as the old economic order has 
vanished. For all developing countries, manufactures rose from only 17.4 percent of 
commodity exports in 1970 to 64.3 percent by 1994 (Figure 7) and it is even bigger a 
decade later. Most of the Third World is now labor abundant and natural resource scarce 
so that they specialize in labor -intensive manufactures. Thus, a fall in the relative price of 
primary products helps foster its rate of industrialization. The classic image of Third 
World specialization in primary products has been obsolescing recently, and fast (see 
Martin 2003; Lindert and Williamson 2003: 249). Even sub-Saharan Africa is shifting out 
of mineral and agricultural exports and in to manufactures, although it only became 
apparent in the early 1990s. The share of manufactures in total exports there was only 12 
or 13 percent in 1991, while it was almost 50 percent in 1998 (Martin 2003: Figure 6).  
But between the British industrial revolution and the 1970s, a new economic 
order emerged, one in which the core increasingly specialized in manufactures and the 
periphery increasingly specialized in primary products. This new economic order had 
asymmetric volatility and secular growth implications such that the terms of trade 
exacerbated the growing GDP per capita gap between core and periphery.  The impact 
seems to have been very big.  
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Appendix  1  
Adjusting Terms of Trade Trends for Quality Change in Manufactures 
 
John Spraos (1980) calculated that the price of primary products relative to 
manufactures fell at about 0.5 percent per annum between the 1870s and just before 
World War II. Enzo Grilli and Maw Cheng Yang (1988) reached the same conclusion for 
the period between 1900 and 1986, a 0.5 percent per annum deterioration. To the extent 
that manufactured goods undergo quality improvements while primary products do not, 
the measured deterioration in the relative price of primary products between 1870 and 
1940 is overstated. And while the secular increase in the terms of trade facing primary 
producers in the poor periphery before 1870 is certainly impressive, how much bigger 
would the measured increase have been were quality improvements in manufacturers 
included? We have no such estimates for the 19th century, but we do have them for the 
20th century. This appendix reports what happens when the latter estimates are used to 
explore their potential impact on the former. 
 There have been very few attempts to gauge how product quality changes 
influence export and import prices, and thus the terms of trade, although the re have been 
quite a few attempts to correct domestic prices for quality change. Most of the latter have 
been for post-war United States (Gordon 1990; Boskin et al. 1998), and hedonic 
techniques have been preferred by most investigators. Robert Lipsey and his 
collaborators have used the estimated impact of US product quality change on traded 
goods prices (Kravis and Lipsey 1971, 1992; Lipsey, Molinari, and Kravis 1991; Lipsey 
1994). For the period 1953 to 1991, they report two findings that are especially relevant 
to any assessment of terms of trade’s long run impact on core relative to periphery.  
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 First, “these quality adjustments are much too gradual to offset the large short-
term or medium-term cycles in terms of trade” (Lipsey 1994: 19). This is an important 
finding since it implies that volatility measures of the terms of trade 1870-1940 will not 
be affected by the omission of quality adjustments. 
 Second, however, secular movements in the pre-1940 terms of trade are likely to 
be profoundly affected since the “average declines in the [quality] adjusted indexes 
relative to the unadjusted ones for [US] exports to the world ... are ... more than a half 
percent per year for all manufacturers …” (Lipsey 1994: 18). Thus, the fall in the terms 
of trade facing primary product exporters 1900-1986 estimated at 0.5 percent per annum 
would have been completely offset if the 0.5 percent per annum quality change for 
manufacturers during the second half of the 20th century also applied to the first half. 
What appeared to Prebisch and Singer to be a spectacular fall in the relative price of 
primary products up to 1940 may have been an illusion created by mis-measurement. 
Furthermore, the rise in the terms of trade facing primary product exporters 1810-1870 
must be understated to the extent that this post-World War II experience also applied to 
the pre-1870 period, although perhaps not with as much drama.  
 Since the rate of productivity advance was faster in the 20th century than it was in 
the 19th century, there is little reason to believe that the same 0.5 percent per annum 
adjustment would apply to the 1810-1870 terms of trade boom facing the periphery. But 
suppose that the rate of quality improvement in traded manufactures was highly 
correlated with the rate of productivity growth in manufacturing? If so, a quality 
adjustment would still be necessary for 1810-1870, but it would be a much smaller 
adjustment than for 1953-1991. We have a fair idea of how much smaller. 
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 The best long run estimates of total factor productivity growth (TFPG) or multi-
factor productivity growth (MFPG) are for the United States and they also have the 
advantage of being estimated separately for manufacturing. These figures and their 
implications for guesses about the rate of quality change on traded manufactures are 
reported in Table A1-1: 
 
Table A1-1 
 
Estimated Productivity Growth and Quality Change in Manufactures: 
The United States 1800-1990 (percentage rates per annum) 
 
               Estimated 
           TFPG     MFPG         MFPG    Quality Change 
    Epoch      Economy          Epoch   Manuf.       Economy       in Manuf. 
 1800-1855 0.3      1800-1870    (0.46) (0.28)         0.09  
 1855-1905 0.5      1870-1913     0.77   0.46         0.15 
 1905-1927 1.5 
 1927-1967 1.9      1913-1964     1.60   1.95         0.63 
         1964-1990     0.62   1.55         0.50 
Sources and Notes: TFPG Economy from Abramovitz and David (1973, Table 1, 
p. 254). MFPG Economy from Gordon (2000, Table 1). Numbers in parentheses 
interpolated from the first column. MFPG Manufacturing from Gordon (1993, 
Table H). Numbers in parentheses interpolated from first column. The estimated 
quality change for 1964-1990 uses Lipsey’s 0.50 estimate for 1953-1991; the 
other entries are assumed to follow the same trend as the MFPG for 
manufacturing. 
 
To account for these estimated quality improvements in imported manufactured goods, 
Table A1-1 implies that the per annum rate of change in the terms of trade facing poor 
primary product exporters should be raised by: 1810-1870 0.09; 1870-1913 0.15; 1913-
1939 0.63; and 1870-1939 0.33. These estimates are used in text Figure 1 and in the text  
discussion. 
 
 
 33 
Appendix 1 Additional References 
 
M. Abramovitz and P. A. David (1973), “Economic Growth in America: Historical  
Parables and Realities,” De Economist 121, 3: 251-72.  
M. J. Boskin, E. R. Dulberger, R. J. Gordon, Z. Griliches and D.W. Jorgenson (1998),  
“Consumer Prices, the Consumer Price Index, and the Cost of Living,” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 12, 1 (Winter): 3-26. 
R. J. Gordon (1990), The Measurement of Durable Goods Prices (Chicago: University of  
Chicago Press). 
R. J. Gordon (1993), “American Economic Growth: One Big Wave?” Unpublished.  
Economics Department, Northwestern University (March). 
R. J. Gordon (2000), “Does the ‘Ne w Economy’ Measure Up to the Great Inventions of  
the Past?” NBER WP 7833 , National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, 
Mass. (August). 
E. Grilli and M. C. Yang (1988), “Primary Commodity Prices, Manufactured Goods  
Prices, and the Terms of Trade of Developing Countries: What the Long Run 
Shows,” The World Bank Economic Review 2, 1 (January): 1-48.  
I. B. Kravis and R. E. Lipsey (1971), Price Competitiveness in World Trade (New York:  
National Bureau of Economic Research). 
I. B. Kravis and R. E. Lipsey (1992), “Sources of Competitiveness of the United States  
and of its Multinational Firms,” Review of Economics and Statistics LXIV, 2 
(May): 193-201. 
R. E. Lipsey (1994), “Quality Change and Other Influences on Measures of Export Prices  
 34 
of Manufactured Goods and the Terms of Trade between Primary Products and 
Manufactures,” NBER WP 4671 , National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Cambridge, Mass. (March). 
R. E. Lipsey, L.  Molinari and I. B. Kravis (1991), “Measures of Prices and Price  
Competitiveness in International Trade in Manufactured Goods,” in P. Hooper 
and J. David Richardson (eds.), International Economic Transactions: Issues in 
Measurement and Empirical Research (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). 
J. Spraos, "The Statistical Debate on the Net Barter Terms of Trade Between Primary  
 Commodities and Manufactures," Economic Journal 90 (1980): 107-28. 
 
 35 
Appendix 2 
Factoring Out the Impact of Terms of Trade Volatility on Growth  
in the Poor Periphery 1815-1870 
 
 There are several options for decomposing terms of trade movements into trend 
and volatility. One can employ the terms of trade growth rate and the standard deviation 
of the growth rate. Yet, the growth rate of the terms of trade over, say, a decade will be 
overstated if there is a positive shock in the tenth year, and unde rstated if there is a 
negative shock. More volatile countries will thus be measured with less accuracy, leading 
to systematic measurement error. In addition, a structural break or a discrete change in 
the rate of growth will register as both a change in trend and a change in volatility, 
potentially confusing the effects. Furthermore, persistent shocks away from trend will 
result in a lower measure of volatility than a shock that returns to trend the following 
year. Shocks that persist for more than a year before returning to trend will register as 
volatility, since they remain deviations from measured trend. The standard deviation of 
the growth rate of the terms of trade, on the other hand, will instead register only the 
initial shock and its eventual return to trend as volatility. The more gradual and consistent 
the return to trend, the lower the volatility measure, and so shocks that die out slowly will 
register as less volatile, even though the distortion may be greater. 
Since the goal is to use measures of trend and volatility that do not relate in a 
systematic way to one another and that minimize the measurement error in the trend, a 
practical solution is to use a filter that produces a smooth trend and stationary deviations. 
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The Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter is a common choice, and Chris Blattman, Jason Hwang 
and myself (2004) have employed it in past work.15   
Terms of trade time series data have been collected for the following seven 
regions: Egypt,  India, Indonesia, Latin America, the Mideast, Spain and the Ottoman 
Empire (Turkey).16 To summarize the discussion above, volatility is measured here as the 
standard deviation of departures from a trend calculated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
Bigger standard deviations imply, of course, greater volatility. Here is what we find: 
Indonesia 1820-1870  3.81 
Latin America 1820-1870 5.18 
 Spain 1815-1870  7.95 
 Turkey 1815-1870  9.24 
 Mideast 1839-1870           19.82 
 Egypt 1820-1870           31.45 
India 1815-1870           23.09 
  
1815-1870 average            14.39 
 1870-1939 average   8.80 
UK1815-1870   6.45 
The pre-1870 terms of trade volatility in the poor periphery was much greater than it was 
afterwards. What is more stunning, however, are the differences between these regions, 
all of which was dictated by natural endowment and commodity specialization. Indonesia 
and Latin America had very stable terms of trade . Egypt, India, and the Mideast, on the 
other hand, had immense volatility. Spain and Turkey lay somewhere in between with 
volatility figures closer to the 1870-1939 average. 
                                                               
15 The smoothing parameter in the HP filter is set at 300, which implies a relatively slow-changing trend. A 
more quickly changing trend (such as that achieved with a smoothing parameter of 100 or lower) does not 
materially affect the results. 
16 The sources of the pre-1870 price data for exports (Px), imports (Pm) and thus for the net barter terms of 
trade (Px/Pm) for Indonesia, India, Latin America, Turkey and Egypt can be found in Clingingsmith and 
Williamson (2004). The Px/Pm data for the United Kingdom are from Brian Mitchell and Phyllis Deane 
(1962: 331). The Mideast Px/Pm data are composed of an unweighted average of Aleppo, Beirut and Iraq 
(Issawi 1988: 148-50). The Px/Pm data for Spain are from ongoing research by Leandro Prados.   
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 The text applies these volatility measures for the decomposition analysis. 
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